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Abstract
In this paper we develop a novel method of wholesale electricity market modeling. Our
optimization-based model decomposes wholesale supply and demand curves into buy and
sell orders of individual market participants. In doing so, the model detects and removes
arbitrage orders. As a result, we construct an innovative fundamental model of a wholesale
electricity market. First, our fundamental demand curve has a unique composition. The
demand curve lies in between the wholesale demand curve and a perfectly inelastic demand
curve. Second, our fundamental supply and demand curves contain only actual (i.e. non-
arbitrage) transactions with physical assets on buy and sell sides. Third, these transactions
are designated to one of the three groups of wholesale electricity market participants: retailers,
suppliers, or utility companies. To evaluate the performance of our model, we use the German
wholesale market data. Our fundamental model yields a more precise approximation of the
actual load values than a model with perfectly inelastic demand. Moreover, we conduct a
study of wholesale demand elasticities. The obtained conclusions regarding wholesale demand
elasticity are consistent with the existing academic literature.
Keywords: Energy economics, Demand Elasticity, Energy Demand, Wholesale Electricity
Markets, Econometric Modeling
JEL: C5, D4, Q41, Q47
1 Introduction
The shift to renewable power is accelerating at a growing pace. Worldwide energy mix becomes
increasingly reliant on wind and solar resources. Their apparent economic efficiency lures in-
vestments, while their environmental benefits attract vocal public support. Coping with their
variability, however, is one of the major challenges of modern policymakers and electricity grid
operators.
Even before the onset of green technologies it was clear that successful integration of renewables
requires a thorough revision and redesign of current energy infrastructure. As e.g. [Turner, 1999]
or [Boyle, 2004] suggest, the issue of variability of green power can be tackled in multiple ways.
Among those ways are, of course, a greater reliance on energy storage technologies (see e.g.
[Carrasco et al., 2006], [Ibrahim et al., 2008], or [Dunn et al., 2011]), development of decentralized
and smart grids (see e.g. [Heier, 2014], [Liserre et al., 2010], [McDaniel and McLaughlin, 2009]l
or [Kempton and Tomic´, 2005]) and, more importantly for the present paper, a more advanced
demand side management (see e.g. [Palensky and Dietrich, 2011], [Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010],
[Siano, 2014]).
Modeling and forecasting in energy markets thus became an increasingly important and complex
task (see e.g. [Weron, 2007] or [Burger et al., 2008]). Models vary in their degree of sophistication,
and focus on a whole multitude of aspects. In turn, in this paper we elaborate an optimization-
based fundamental model of a wholesale electricity market. More specifically, our model is based on
econometric manipulations with wholesale electricity supply and demand curves. Important is the
1University of Duisburg-Essen, corresponding author. Email: sergei.kulakov@uni-due.de.
2University of Duisburg-Essen.
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fact that these manipulations are rooted into determining a unique composition of the fundamental
demand curve.
Our demand curve lies ”in between” the wholesale demand curve (which incorporates many
arbitrage orders) and a perfectly inelastic demand curve (which is an extreme assumption). In other
words, our demand retains some elasticities, but eliminates arbitrage orders. More specifically, our
demand incorporates only actual transaction with physical assess on both buy and sell sides. As a
result, the demand curve in our fundamental model constitutes a better approximation of the true
demand curve in a wholesale electricity market, i.e. of a curve which corresponds to the actual
electricity load.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of the present section first provides a literature
review. Then, subsections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 elaborate on details of the papers by [Coulon et al., 2014]
and [Knaut and Paulus, 2016], respectively. These papers are worthy particular attention because
they lay the foundation for our model. Finally, the introduction is concluded with a general
overview of our contribution. Section 2 is the description of our model. Subsection 2.1 comments
on general intuition behind our idea. Subsection 2.2 is devoted to the technical summary of
the model. Subsection 2.3 shows an application of our model to imaginary data. Institutional
framework of the German electricity market as well as specifications of the data are outlined in
section 3. Section 4 discusses the obtained results. Section 5 is the conclusion.
1.1 Literature review
As was mentioned before, the kernel of our model is built on determining the composition of the
fundamental demand curve. Therefore, to keep the literature review relatively concise, its focus
will be placed on three main topics: approaches to modeling residential and industrial demand,
discussion of literature on wholesale demand elasticities, and econometric modeling of wholesale
supply and demand curves. Special attention will be paid to works by [Coulon et al., 2014] and
[Knaut and Paulus, 2016] because they lay the foundation for our research.
Residential and industrial demand for energy has been analyzed extensively in academic liter-
ature. Therefore, multiple approaches to modeling demand in electricity markets exist. Following
[Labandeira et al., 2012], many of these approaches payed particular attention to estimating de-
mand elasticity. Not surprisingly so, as [Kirschen, 2003] suggest. Knowing price sensitivity of
private households and industry players can be of great utility to energy producers and grid opera-
tors. Moreover, [Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008] show that the success of different demand response
programs and the corresponding cost-cuttings can be highly dependent on the accuracy of the
demand elasticity estimation.
[Labandeira et al., 2012] and [Bigerna and Bollino, 2014] argue that there are two main ways
to model electricity demand. The former one relies on macroeconomic data to construct aggregate
econometric models. The data may include electricity prices, income levels and climatic con-
ditions. This approach was followed by e.g. [Narayan and Smyth, 2005], [Narayan et al., 2007],
[Bernstein and Griffin, 2006], or [Holtedahl and Joutz, 2004] to study residential demand, while
e.g. [Kamerschen and Porter, 2004] and [Paul et al., 2009], and [Taylor et al., 2005] analyzed in-
dustrial and aggregated demand besides residential one.
The second way is to focus on microeconomic data or consumer surveys. A model may thus
be based on characteristics, sizes, types, and preferences of households and companies. Among
papers which restricted to this approach are e.g. [Alberini et al., 2011], [Fuks and Salazar, 2008],
[Leth-Petersen, 2002], [Labandeira et al., 2006], [Fell et al., 2014], [Krishnamurthy and Kristro¨m, 2015]
or [Schulte and Heindl, 2017] who studied residential elasticities. Industrial demand is investigated
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in, for example, [Woodland, 1993] and [Bardazzi et al., 2015].
On the contrary, the body of academic literature on modeling wholesale demand is rather
scarce. Moreover, papers in this field may follow slightly different modeling approaches. A more
traditional method is used by e.g. [Lijesen, 2007] who build up their model based on lagged day-
ahead prices and temperature data. On the other hand, [Bo¨nte et al., 2015] use wind speed as a
main proxy for demand elasticity. So do [Knaut and Paulus, 2016]. [Bigerna and Bollino, 2014]
pursue yet another novel approach. They critique a common practice of determining residual
demand and estimate demand elasticity from the available wholesale bid data.
The present paper will be similar to the latter one in a sense that our modeling approach is also
rooted into wholesale market data. However, we, too, develop a new and rather unconventional
approach. We will focus solely on manipulations with wholesale supply and demand curves.
Theoretical background of our paper thus stems from the field of econometric modeling of auc-
tion curves in a wholesale electricity market. [Barlow, 2002] were among the first researchers who
attempted to construct a model based on real-world electricity auction data. [Buzoianu et al., 2012]
study Californian electricity prices on the grounds of latent supply and demand curves. To estimate
the curves, they exploit temperature data, seasonality factors and gas availability. Furthermore,
structural approaches have also be undertaken. [Carmona et al., 2013] and [Howison and Coulon, 2009]
use bid stack to derive electricity spot prices on the grounds of power demand and prices of gen-
erating fuels.
Wholesale auction curves were analyzed and manipulated in the following papers. [Ziel and Steinert, 2016]
use day-ahead EEX auction curves to forecast German day-ahead electricity pries. Instead of an-
alyzing the price time series, the authors of the paper suggest to predict auction curves in their
entirety. The intersection of the predicted curves, of course, coincides with the price forecast.
[Dillig et al., 2016] try to quantify the impact of renewable energies on electricity prices in the
German market. Their model is also based on the EEX curves. To obtain the results, the authors
of the paper add or subtract amounts of renewable power generation from the initial auction curves
data. In other words, their model shifts one of the curves depending on the supply of renewable
energy. A similar technique is employed in [Kulakov and Ziel, 2019]. By shifting either the whole-
sale supply or demand curve, a non-linear impact of renewable energy generation on intra-day
electricity prices is shown. The higher the renewable generation is, the stronger the prices in an
intra-day market will react to the changes.
Finally, the papers written by [Coulon et al., 2014] and [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] require our
particular attention because they build up the foundation for our research. These papers will thus
be discussed at length in the forthcoming two sections.
1.1.1 Transformation of the wholesale auction curves
Of pivotal importance for the present study is a concept elaborated by [Coulon et al., 2014]. The
concept suggests that it is possible to transform wholesale supply and demand curves such that
the demand curve becomes inelastic. Noteworthy is the fact that the equilibrium price remains
the same before and after the transformation. On the contrary, the equilibrium volume increases.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the concept’s functioning. The left hand side of the
Figure shows the actual wholesale market auction curves observed in the German EPEX SPOT
SE on 2017-01-01 at 00:00:00. The right hand side of the Figure depicts a transformed version of
the two curves with perfectly inelastic demand.
[Coulon et al., 2014] elaborate on the intuition behind their idea at length. Following their
reasoning, there are only few price-sensitive consumers in power markets. On the other hand, the
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demand curve in the wholesale market is elastic. At first, this contradiction seems counterintutive.
However, besides the wholesale market, there exist another big bilateral venue where power sup-
pliers are connected directly with their consumers. Therefore, whenever the prices in the wholesale
market are lower than those in the bilateral one, multiple market participants discover arbitrage
opportunities and decide to engage into speculation. They try to purchase electricity instead of
producing it. Naturally, speculation leads to a surge in price sensitivity.
Hence, having two parallel markets may lead to considerable complications for energy sector
modeling. To avoid them, [Coulon et al., 2014] suggest shifting the entire elasticity from the
demand to the supply side. As a result, a perfectly inelastic demand curve will be obtained.
Moreover, both the transformed supply and the demand curves are more stable and predictable
because many orders in a wholesale market are of speculative nature.
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Figure 1: A wholesale market equilibrium in the EPEX SPOT SE on 2017-01-02 01:00:00 (left
plot) vs. its manipulated form with an inelastic demand curve (right plot)
1.1.2 Aggregated Supply and Demand case and the Wholesale Market
The kernel of our model stems from a market transformation carried out by [Knaut and Paulus, 2016].
However, intuition behind the transformation has not been elaborated in the original paper. There-
fore, prior to explaining the model itself, we have to comment on functioning of its underpinnings.
First of all, we introduce a toy example of a fictional electricity market. Describing the model
on the grounds of the toy example appears to be more straightforward and much simpler. We
assume an economy populated by three market participants: a Utility company, a Retailer, and a
Supplier. The agents differ in their abilities to interact with the market. Utility can post both bid
and ask orders, Retailer can only demand electricity from the market, and the choice of Supplier is
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restricted only to bid orders. Of course, the number of market participants can easily be expanded.
In our case, however, each of them can be treated as the respective generalized representation of
a country’s power utility companies, electricity retailers, and electricity suppliers.
Individual supply and demand schedules of the market agents in our toy example are represented
in Figures 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), respectively. Please note that the internal equilibrium price of
Utility equals to zero. This price was selected because it allows us to demonstrate all features
of our model more explicitly. Moreover, to ease further notation, each single step in the supply
curves of the market participants will be referred to as a sell order. In turn, by a buy order we
will denote a single step in the demand curves.
As [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] suggest, traders’ orders can be aggregated by means of two dif-
ferent techniques. The two resulting equilibria will be referred to as an Aggregated Supply and
Demand case (ASD) and a Wholesale Market (WM). Even though the choice of a technique does
non influence equilibrium prices, it does affect equilibrium volumes and the compositions of the
market supply and demand curves. The focus of the present section will thus be placed on the
discussion of these two techniques.
Graphical depictions of both final equilibria are provided in Figures 2(d) and 2(e), respectively.
Explaining how both solutions were obtained is another challenge we face at this stage. To simplify
the forthcoming description, we create two auxiliary variables: a supply pool and a demand pool.
Following their names, the variables will be used to collect buy and sell orders of the market
participants. Separation into two pools will become especially useful for the discussion of the more
cumbersome WM case.
Let us first concentrate on the ASD equilibrium and Figure 2(d). The demand curve in this
case was built up as follows. First, we collected Utility’s and Retailer’s buy orders in the demand
pool. Second, we sorted the orders in the demand pool according to their prices. Third, we
plotted the obtained data. The supply curve in this case was then constructed analogously. First,
we collected Utility’s and Supplier’s sell orders in the supply pool. Second, we sorted the orders
in the supply pool according to their prices. Third, we plotted the obtained data. The upper part
Table 1 summarizes components of both the supply and demand pools in the ASD case.
Much less intuitive is the functioning of the WM equilibrium. The main characteristic of the
wholesale market is an assumption that Utility is allowed to engage into speculation.3 As a result,
the bidding strategy of Utility changes. On the other hand, the behavior of both Retailer and
Supplier remains the same. This case is illustrated in Figure 2(e) and is supported by the lower
part of Table 1. Moreover, to ease the forthcoming explanation, we divided the Utility’s supply
and demand curves into 4 sectors. These sectors are illustrated in Figure 3(a).
Supply Pool Demand Pool
ASD
Sell orders of Supplier Buy orders of Retailer
Sell orders of Utility Buy orders of Utility
WM
Sell orders of Supplier Buy orders of Retailer
Sell orders of Utility from Sector 1 Buy orders of Utility from Sector 4
Buy orders of Utility from Sector 2 Sell orders of Utility from Sector 3
Table 1: Supply and Demand pools in the ASD and WM cases
Let us now consider the demand curve in the WM scenario. Given that Retailer can not act as
3Please note that by speculation we only assume that Utility tries to purchase electricity instead of producing
it. The forthcoming description will show that this speculation is risk-free.
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Figure 2: A toy example of an electricity market
6
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Utility
Quantity (MW)
P
ri
ce
(E
U
R
/M
W
)
0 20 40 60
3
2 1
4
(a) Utility Sectors
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Utility WM
Quantity (MW)
P
ri
ce
(E
U
R
/M
W
)
0 20 40 60
(b) Utility WM
Figure 3: Auxiliary plots for explanation of the WM case: (a) breakdown of the space of Utility
into four sectors and (b) buy and sell orders of Utility in the WM case
a speculator, we place all its buy orders into the demand pool. Then, we shift our focus to Utility.
We include orders located in sectors 3 and 4 in the demand pool. The following rationale can be
used to justify the choice of these orders. First, the buy orders in sector 4 are located to the right
of the internal equilibrium of Utility. Therefore, these orders are out-of-the-money and Utility can
not capitalize on them. Utility thus hopes that they may be interesting to other market players.
Hence, the buy orders from sector 4 end up in the demand pool. Second, placing the sell orders
from sector 3 in the demand pool at first seems counterintuitive. However, we suppose that Utility
decides to halt its own electricity production. Instead, Utility tries to purchase these orders at
the same prices in the wholesale market. Purchasing rather than generating electricity may allow
Utility to e.g. spare some maintenance costs.4 Hence, Utility no longer tries to produce the orders
located in sector 3 itself. On the contrary, Utility attempts to buy these orders in the market.
Therefore, they are placed in the demand pool in the WM case.
At this stage there are three groups of orders left unassigned. They will thus become compo-
nents of the supply pool. More specifically, the three groups are: the sell orders of Supplier, the
sell orders of Utility from sector 1, and the buy orders of Utility from sector 2. Let us now discuss
why the orders from these groups are placed into the supply pool. Given the above discussion, the
treatment of the former group appears straightforward. The latter two groups, in turn, require a
special attention. Analogously to the Utility’s buy orders from sector 4, the sell orders in sector
1 are out-of-the-money. Therefore, Utility attempts to find new customers among other market
4Other possible reasons for speculation were mentioned in subsection 1.1.1
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participants for these orders. Finally, intuition behind manipulations with the buy orders from
sector 2 is connected to the sell orders from sector 3. From the previous paragraph we know that
Utility intends to purchase the sell orders from sector 3 instead of producing them. To be able to
carry out this transaction, Utility needs money. Thus, Utility places the buy orders from sector 2
in the supply pool. In doing so, Utility hopes that these orders would be acquired by other market
participants. If other market agents indeed buy these orders, Utility obtains necessary funds to
engage into the speculation and purchase the sell orders from sector 3.
Figure 3(b) may be useful to amend the above explanation. This Figure shows us supply and
demand schedules of Utility in the WM case. Let us now examine these schedules in greater detail.
First, we can see explicitly that the downward-sloping demand curve incorporates the sell orders
from sector 3. Second, the buy orders from sector 2 were included into the upward-sloping supply
curve. Third, there are no orders in the downward-sloping demand curve which are more expensive
than the internal equilibrium price of Utility. Fourth, there are no orders in the upward-sloping
supply curve which are cheaper than the internal equilibrium price of Utility. Finally, the internal
equilibrium price of Utility remains the same in both ASD and WM cases.
Having elaborated on the fundamentals of both ASD and WM equilibria, we can now study
their features. First of all, note that the equilibrium prices are the same in both cases. On the
contrary, the equilibrium volumes are higher in the latter case. The discrepancy in the volume sizes
can be explained by the fact that Utility tries to abstain from production of electricity in the WM
scenario. Naturally, this assumption goes in line with subsection 1.1.1. Therefore, market clears
under an assumption that Utility does not supply some electricity to the market. Second, elasticity
of the demand curve is typically higher in the WM case. This fact seems obvious given that Utility
tries to speculate in the wholesale market and is thus more sensitive to price fluctuations.
Moreover, there is a final commentary regarding the two equilibria. Note that Utility may
realize that speculating is no longer profitable after the equilibrium price has been established.
In other words, Utility will chose to refrain from speculation if its internal costs for electricity
generation are lower than the market prices. In this case final load values in both ASD and WM
scenarios will coincide. From this perspective, Utility does not face any risks when trying to
speculate in a wholesale market. Therefore, Utility’s orders in the wholesale supply and demand
curves are arbitrage orders.
1.2 Main idea and motivation
Following [Coulon et al., 2014], a model with perfectly inelastic demand is an extreme represen-
tation of an electricity market. Of course, transferring all demand elasticities to the supply side
allows us to simplify computations substantially. However, sensitivity of some market agents to
the price should not be neglected. Thus, the model with perfectly inelastic demand remains an
imperfect solution. On the other hand, the wholesale market equilibrium, too, is not fully infor-
mative. The presence of arbitrage orders in this equilibrium distorts true intentions of market
participants. Therefore, as the paper by [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] suggests, the ASD equilibrium
can provide us with a more precise approximation of a wholesale electricity market.
In fact, the ASD solution lies ”in between” the solution with inelastic demand and the WM
case. Therefore, the equilibrium volumes obtained in these two cases are respectively greater and
lower than those in the ASD equilibrium. Moreover, the ASD market volumes, as we will later
demonstrate, exhibit a stronger correlation with true total load values in an electricity market.
Better suitability of the ASD solution for load approximation can be easily explained by commen-
taries made in the previous sections.
8
The model described in section 1.1.2 may suggest that obtaining the ASD solution is relatively
simple. In reality, however, it not necessarily is. Many electricity exchanges, including e.g. the
German EPEX SPOT SE, do not disclose individual buy and sell orders of market participants.
Therefore, the data available to scientists only constitutes auction curves drawn in a wholesale
market. Precise compositions of these curves and contributions of each market player to these
curves is not announced publicly. Hence, if we remain in the world of our toy example, the auction
curves which are typically disclosed to market participants look like those in Figure 4(b) and not
like those in Figure 4(a).
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Figure 4: Auxiliary plots for explanation of the WM case: (a) wholesale market equilibrium in
our toy example (b) auction curves in this equilibrium as are typically disclosed by an electricity
exchange
Nevertheless, we have a certain knowledge about how exactly both ASD and WM solutions
can be assembled. Given this knowledge, it is possible to derive the supply and demand schedules
of market participants from the wholesale market data. More specifically, our optimization-based
model will back-decompose the wholesale auction curves into individual buy and sell orders of
market agents. The ASD equilibrium can be constructed easily once the decomposition is complete.
2 Model
2.1 Intuition behind the functioning of the model
The to-be-undertaken decomposition of the wholesale auction curves is relatively sophisticated.
Prior to explaining its details, two comments are to be made. First, in what follows we will use
the name Fundamental Model (FM) to refer to the ASD case. The choice of the name appears
rational because we will no longer apply our model to an imaginary data set. Therefore, our ASD
solution will correspond to a fundamental model of a wholesale electricity market. Second, the
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decomposition will be formulated as an optimization problem. To obtain our FM model, we will
minimize the distance between the FM equilibrium volumes and the true load values. In fact, the
decomposition will be carried out along the five steps listed below. Referring to these steps may
ease the understanding of the model’s description.
1. Define the basic mathematical framework of the model
2. Conjecture the internal equilibrium price of Utility. Since individual supply and demand
schedules of market participants remain undisclosed, there is no information regarding the
internal equilibrium of Utility. Hence, this step is critical because of two main reasons.
First, the only difference between the ASD and WM cases lies in the Utility’s bidding strat-
egy. Second, the Utility’s behavior is solely predetermined by its internal equilibrium price.
Therefore, making an assumption regarding this price is necessary to perform the decompo-
sition.
3. Break down the wholesale supply and demand curves into individual supply and demand
schedules of market participants. To carry out the decomposition, we will rely on the conjec-
tured internal price of Utility and on our knowledge about the functioning of the wholesale
market. Moreover, important is that at this stage we will obtain supply and demand curves
of Utility in the WM setting.5 These curves have to be transformed from WM to FM case
in the next step.
4. Convert the Utility’s curves from WM to FM setting.
5. Combine the obtained supply and demand schedules of the market participants in an FM
equilibrium. Ensure that the distance between the FM market volumes and true load values
is minimized.
2.2 Model description
2.2.1 Defining the basic mathematical framework of the model
To explain the model, we will still remain in the world of the toy example introduced in section
1.1.2. Before we proceed further, let pmin = −20 and pmax = 100. These two borders correspond
to the ones given in the toy example. We thus can define the supply and demand curves in a
wholesale market as follows
WSup : (0,∞)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Volumes
7→ [pmin, pmax] (1)
WDem :(0,∞) 7→ [pmin, pmax] (2)
with the respective inverses being given by
WSup−1 :[pmin, pmax] 7→ (0,∞) (3)
WDem−1 :[pmin, pmax] 7→ (0,∞). (4)
5The schedules of Utility in this setting were depicted in Figure 3(b)
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Please note that the above defined curves correspond to those depicted in Figure 4(b). This implies
that all manipulations described below will be performed on auction curves with unknown com-
positions, i.e. on curves without a clear breakdown into individual orders of market participants.
The market equilibrium can be clearly determined as follows
(vW , pW ) = {v,WSup(v)|WSup(v) = WDem(v), v > 0} (5)
where v denotes the volume and W stands for the wholesale market.
2.2.2 Conjecturing the internal equilibrium price of Utility
As was mentioned earlier, the internal equilibrium price of Utility predetermines the differences
between the ASD and WM cases. Since this price is typically not announced publicly, we need to
conjecture it.
Let us denote the internal equilibrium price of Utility by pU . We suppose that price pU is
a linear function of the wholesale market price. This assumption, despite being simple, appears
reasonable. Utility would not be able to operate in a market successfully if its prices would
substantially deviate from market prices. The following statement can hence be made
pU = a0 + a1p
W (6)
where a0 and a1 denote the intercept and the slope, respectively. Finally, to ease the forthcoming
description of the model, we suppose that the Utility’s internal equilibrium price is greater than
the respective equilibrium market price.
2.2.3 Breaking down the wholesale supply and demand curves into individual supply
and demand schedules of market participants
In this section we will determine supply and demand schedules of Supplier, Retailer, and Utility
in the WM setting. As has already been said, the strategies of Supplier and Retailer do not vary
between the FM and WM equilibria. The strategy of Utility, however, does. Hence, the two
obtained supply and demand curves of Utility will be modified further in subsection 2.2.4. To be
able to distinguish market participants from one another, will use index 0 to denote Supplier or
Retailer, and will use index 1 for Utility.
Step 1: determining the supply and demand schedules of Supplier and Retailer
First of all, let us return to Figure 2(e) and focus on the wholesale supply curve. As can be
seen from the Figure and as was mentioned in section 1.1.2, Utility will not place an order on
the supply side if this order is priced below the Utility’s internal equilibrium price pU . Therefore,
all orders in the wholesale supply curve which are cheaper than pU belong to Supplier. In turn,
orders more expensive than the price pU can either be posted by Utility or by Supplier. In other
words, the wholesale supply curve above the price pU is split in some proportion between Utility
and Supplier.6
The supply schedule of Supplier is thus built up of two components. The first component is
the segment of the wholesale supply curve below price pU . The second component is a part of the
6We will calculate this proportion by using an optimization tool later.
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upper segment of the wholesale supply curve (above price pU). The corresponding mathematical
representation can be written as follows
Sup−10 (p) = 1[pmin,pU )WSup
−1(p)
+ 1(pU ,pmax]
(
WSup−1(pU) + (1− γ1)
(
WSup−1(p)−WSup−1(pU)
))
(7)
where coefficient γ1 denotes the Utility’s proportion in the upper segment of the wholesale supply
curve.
Of course, the demand schedules of Retailer can be derived analogously. Following Figure 2(e),
the upper segment of the wholesale demand curve (above the price pU) belongs solely to Retailer.
The segment below price pU is split in some proportion between Retailer and Utility. Hence, it
holds that
Dem−10 (p) = 1(pU ,pmax]WDem
−1(p)
+ 1[pmin,pU )
(
WDem−1(pU) + (1− φ1)
(
WDem−1(p)−WDem−1(pU)
))
(8)
where coefficient φ1 denotes the Utility’s proportion in the lower segment of the wholesale demand
curve.
Step 2: determining supply and demand schedules of Utility in the WM setting
From equation 7 and Figure 3(b) we know that the upper segment of the wholesale supply
curve is split between Supplier and Utility. Therefore, the upward-sloping supply curve of Utility
in the WM case can be written as
WSup−11 (p) = 1(pU ,pmax]γ1
(
WSup−1(p)−WSup−1(pU)
)
. (9)
In turn, following equation 8, the downward-sloping curve can be represented as
WDem−11 (p) = 1[pmin,pU )φ1
(
WDem−1(p)−WDem−1(pU)
)
. (10)
Hence, equations 9 and 10 define Utility’s auction curves in the WM case as depicted in Figure
5(a). The following section will be devoted to transforming these curves from WM to FM setting.
2.2.4 Converting the Utility’s schedules from wholesale market to fundamental model
setting
As section 1.1.2 suggests, Figure 5(a) corresponds to Figure 3(b). However, to be able to construct
the FM equilibrium, Utility’s auction curves in the initial setting (as depicted in e.g. Figure 3(a) )
are required. Transforming the supply and demand curves of Utility from WM to FM case is thus
the main aim of the present subsection. This transformation will be carried out in two steps.
Step 1: separating the Utility’s WM curves into buy and sell orders
Remember that the supply and demand curves depicted in Figure 3(b) incorporate both buy and
sell orders. However, following section 1.2 and Figure 5(a), we do not know the exact compositions
of the Utility’s curves in our case. Therefore, we have to divide the Utility’s WM curves into buy
and sell orders. Following the general structure of the model, an optimization-based technique will
be used to determine the proportions in which orders are to be divided.
Let us now consider the downward-sloping demand curve in Figure 5(a). Suppose that orders
in this curve are split equally between the buy and sell sides. To quantify this assumption, we
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Figure 5: Auxiliary plot for the explanation of the WM case: transformation of the Utility’s curves
from WM to FM setting
introduce a new coefficient α1 = 0.5. Then, following Figure 3, half of the downward-sloping
demand curve remains on the buy side. On the contrary, the other half of this curve is flipped
onto the supply side. In other words, as we can see from Figure 5(b), the lower part (below price
pU) of the supply curve of Utility FM is a flipped half of the downward-sloping demand curve of
Utility WM. Naturally, the supply and demand curves below the price pU in the Utility FM case
look like mirrored versions of one another because α1 = 0.5.
We can now use the same method to decompose the supply curve of Utility WM. Let us thus
focus on the upward-sloping curve in Figure 5(a). Assume that the orders in this curve, too, are
split equally between the buy and sell sides. Therefore, let β1 = 0.5. As the description provided in
the previous paragraph suggests, one half of the upward-sloping curve is flipped onto the demand
side. Hence, as can be seen from Figure 5(b), the upper part of the demand curve (above the price
pU) in the FM case is a flipped half of the upward-sloping supply curve of Utility WM.
Hence, the supply curve depicted in Figure 5(b) can be represented mathematically as
F˜Sup
−1
1 (p) = 1[pmin,pU )α1
(
WDem−11 (pmin)−WDem
−1
1 (p)
)
+ 1(pU ,pmax]
(
α1WDem
−1
1 (pmin) + (1− β1)WSup
−1
1 (p)
)
(11)
where α1 is a portion of sell orders in the downward-sloping curve of Utility WM and β1 denotes
a portion of buy orders in the upward-sloping curve of Utility WM. The first line of the above
equation is thus a horizontally flipped part of the demand curve of Utility WM.7
7Note that the assumptions α1 = 0.5 and β1 were only made to simplify the description of the model. The actual
values of α1 and β1 have to be determined by means of an optimization tool.
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In turn, the definition of the demand curve illustrated in Figure 5(b) reads
F˜Dem
−1
1 (p) = 1(pU ,pmax]β1
(
WSup−11 (pmax)−WSup
−1
1 (p)
)
+ 1[pmin,pU )
(
β1WSup
−1
1 (pmax) + (1− α1)WDem
−1
1 (p)
)
. (12)
Equations 11 and 12, however, do not describe the final versions of Utility’s curves in the FM case.
These equations will be modified further in the next step.
Step 2: reconciling equilibrium prices of Utility WM and Utility FM
From section 1.1.2 and Figure 3 we know that the internal equilibrium price of Utility is the same
in WM and FM settings. On the other hand, Figures 5(a) and 5(b) indicate explicitly that prices
may differ after the decomposition of the wholesale auction curves. Naturally, this discrepancy
violates our assumption. Therefore, we have to further manipulate the curves of Utility FM for
the equilibrium prices of Utility in both WM and FM settings to be reconciled.
Our solution to solve the problem is rather simple. We merely decide to shift one of the Utility’s
curves to the right unless equilibrium prices in FM and WM cases are reconciled.8 Despite being
counterintuitive at first, this approach proves to be extremely efficient and does not contradict to
the main aim of our model. Figures 5(b) and 5(c) provide us with the corresponding graphical
representations.
Of course, shifting one of the curves to the right may imply that we ”create” additional volumes.
One would thus expect that we should subtract the added volumes from other parts of the curves.
However, when the model is applied to real data, subtracting these volumes will inevitably distort
either the internal price of Utility, or the equivalence of the prices in final WM and FM equilibria.
Therefore, a question arises: where do these additional volumes come from?
Let us now suppose that we shift the Utility’s supply curve.9 Note that the need to maintain
the stability of an energy system forces energy producers to offer must-run supply at minimal
prices. Therefore, sell orders at the lowest price are typically much more voluminous than other
sell orders. Following section 1.1.2, these must-run sell orders are located in the segment pmin of the
downward-sloping demand curve of Utility WM. Hence, when converting the schedules of Utility
form WM to FM setting, we, theoretically, should not only shift the supply curve of Utility FM
to the right. We should also subtract the shift size from the segment pmin of the demand curve of
Utility FM.
However, important is the fact that this segment is represented graphically only in the toy
example. It is not displayed in real-world examples. Actually observed wholesale auction curves
almost abruptly end at the prices pmin and pmax.
10 In other words, we indeed can subtract the
volumes in question, but only if we remain in the world of the toy example. Moreover, it is worthy
to note that manipulations with the far-right segments of the curves influence neither Utility’s
price nor the prices in WM and FM cases. The equilibrium remains unchanged even if no volumes
are subtracted. The shape of the demand curve, too, remains unaffected.
Figure 9 will provide an even greater motivation for using the second approach. As we will
later demonstrate, equilibrium volumes we obtain approximate the actual load values better than
the model with perfectly inelastic demand and the wholesale market volumes. Therefore, after
several adjustments our model can be used successfully for load forecasting.
8Intuition behind which curve needs to be shifted will be elaborated in what follows.
9Of course, the reasoning is analogous for the demand side.
10Figure 7 plots two auction curves observed in the German day-ahead wholesale electricity market.
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Let us now explain how the shift of Utility’s curves is implemented into the model. First, we
will denote the magnitude of the shift by τ1 and assume that
τ1 = F˜ Sup
−1
1 (p
U)− F˜Dem
−1
1 (p
U) (13)
Hence, we determine the shift size by calculating the difference between volumes on supply and
demand curves at point pU . From equation 13 it appears clear that τ1 is negative if the demand
curve is located to the right of the supply curve at the point pU . Hence, we will shift the Utility’s
supply curve if τ1 < 0. Otherwise, if τ1 > 0, then the demand curve has to be shifted.
Then, the equations for the adjusted supply and demand curves of Utility FM can be respec-
tively represented as
FSup−11(p) = 1[pmin,pU )α1
(
WDem−11 (pmin)−WDem
−1
1 (p)
)
+ 1(pU ,pmax]
(
α1WDem
−1
1 (pmin) + (1− β1)WSup
−1
1 (p)
)
−min(τ1, 0) (14)
and
FDem−11(p) = 1(pU ,pmax]β1
(
WSup−11 (pmax)−WSup
−1
1 (p)
)
+ 1[pmin,pU )
(
β1WSup
−1
1 (pmax) + (1− α1)WDem
−1
1 (p)
)
+max(τ1, 0). (15)
Figure 5(c) plots the final curves of Utility in the FM case. As can be seen from the Figure,
the equilibrium price of Utility FM equals to that of Utility WM once the adjustment was made.
Moreover, in our case factor τ1 was positive since the initial supply curve of Utility FM is located
to the left of the demand curve at the point pU . Therefore, the supply curve was shifted to the
right. The shift magnitude is highlighted in gray in Figure 5(c).
2.2.5 Assembling the Fundamental Model and formulating the optimization problem
The above defined supply and demand schedules of the market participants allow us to build up the
FM equilibrium. Hence, the market demand curve in the FM case can be obtained by aggregating
the sell orders of Retailer and Utility. The following statement can thus be made
FDem−1 = Dem−10 + FDem
−1
1 . (16)
The market supply curve in the FM case can then be defined analogously as
FSup−1 = Sup−10 + FSup
−1
1 (17)
It follows that the intersection between the FM supply and demand curves can be defined as
(vF , pF ) = {(v,FSup(v)|FSup(v) = FDem(v)), v > 0}, (18)
where pW = pF and vW < vF as follows from section 1.1.2 and equation 5.
As the previous sections suggest, values of vW in the wholesale market are much smaller than
the actual load values. Note that not only arbitrage orders influence the difference. Final load
reflects volumes from intra-day trading (both the intra-day auctions and continuous trading),
OTC-deals, and potentially other markets.11 Therefore, volumes vF in our FM equilibrium, too,
11For example, the EXAA can be considered as an ”other market” for the case of Germany.
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must be smaller than the actual load values. Moreover, volumes vF must be lower than those
suggested by the model with perfectly inelastic demand. This holds because the latter model
leaves no ealsticities at the demand side.
Finally, the core of our optimization model can be explained as follows. We will minimize the
distance between the actual load values and the equilibrium volumes in the FM case. Speaking
technically, a linear fit optimization problem can thus be written as follows
argmin
θ0,θ1
Q(θ0, θ1) where Q(θ0, θ1) =
n∑
i=1
(loadi − θ0 − θ1v
F )2 (19)
2.3 Applying the model to the toy example
To test the functioning of our model, we first remain in the world of our toy example. Naturally,
we use Figure 4(b) as the starting point. For illustration purposes we suppose the following set
of coefficients: a0 = 0.5, a1 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.5, φ1 = 0.5, α1 = 0.5, β1 = 0.5. The obtained model is
presented in Figure 6. There are two properties of our model to be noted.
First, our knowledge of the bidding strategies allows us to compute the difference vF − vW
on the grounds of our model. From Figures 2(d) and 2(e) we know that orders to the left of the
equilibrium in the WM case can belong only to Retailer or Supplier. On the contrary, orders to
the left of the equilibrium in the FM case can be submitted by Retailer, Supplier, and Utility.
Therefore, the difference vF − vW stems from the Utility’s orders. The following statement can
thus be made
vF − vW =
{
FSup−11 (p
U)− (FDem−11 (p
F )− FDem−11 (p
U)) if pU ≤ pF
FDem−11 (p
U)− (FSup−11 (p
F )− FSup−11 (p
U)) if pU ≥ pF
(20)
Therefore, the relation between the prices pU and pF determines which of the auction curves has
to be shifted to the right. Moreover, to compute the difference vF − vW we have to focus on a
curve that has not been adjusted.
Second, the model with perfectly inelastic demand is an extreme form of our model. Under
the parameter setting a0 = 0, a1 = 1, γ1 = 1, φ1 = 1, α1 = 0, β1 = 0 all demand elasticities
are transferred to the supply side.12 More specifically, this setting first assumes that Utility’s
internal price equals to the wholesale market price. Second, Utility attains all possible orders
from the wholesale auction curves. Third, when converting Utility’s schedules from WM to FM
case, all orders are transferred from the demand to the supply side. Therefore, the demand curve
is represented only by one point, all volumes are accumulated on the supply side, and the final
equilibrium volume reaches its maximum.
3 Empirical Data
3.1 Institutional framework of the German electricity market
We chose to test our model on the German data. Wholesale electricity trading in Germany takes
place on several different marketplaces. Their timing is well illustrated in [Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017].
Their detailed overview is provided on the EPEX SPOT SE website or in e.g. [Hagemann and Weber, 2013].
Additionally to wholesale markets, electricity is actively traded via various OTC-contracts.
12Implications of each of the coefficients are be elaborated at length in section 4.1
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Figure 6: Obtaining the Fundamental Model using the wholesale market data from the toy example
with a0 = 0.5, a1 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.5, φ1 = 0.5, α1 = 0.5, β1 = 0.5
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First of all, a day-ahead auction for hourly products is conducted at 12:00 on a daily basis.
Following the rules of the exchange, minimal price in the day-ahead market equals to pmin = −500
EUR and maximal price is limited to pmax = 3000 EUR. Market participants are expected to
submit their bids to an auctioneer prior to the start of the auction. Once the bidding window
closes, the EPEX system matches the orders, constructs wholesale supply and demand auction
curves, and establishes 24 hourly prices for the next day. These prices are announced as soon as
possible from 12:42. Besides the prices, also the auction curves are disclosed publicly. However,
these curves are revealed only in their aggregated form, i.e. individual orders of market participants
still remain concealed. Moreover, there exists another day-ahead auction for 15-minutes contracts.
This auction clears at 15:00 every day.
In addition to the day-ahead market, a continuous intra-day trading for hourly contracts begins
at 15:00 the day before physical electricity delivery and closes 30 minutes prior to the delivery. Con-
tinuous auction for 15-minutes contracts begins at 16:00 daily. Details of the German continuous
intra-day market are discussed at length in e.g. [von Luckner et al., 2017].
Finally, energy can be traded in a balancing market to eliminate discrepancies between elec-
tricity supply and demand. Imbalances are traded ex-post. This market is studied at length in
e.g. [Just and Weber, 2015].
3.2 Data Set
Our sample period extends from 31.12.2016 to 31.12.2017. To decrease computational burden
of our model, we will set the upper and lower price bounds to pmin,2017 = −83.05 EUR and
pmax,2017 = 163.50 EUR. The selected values correspond to the minimum and maximum observa-
tion, respectively, present in the in-sample period.
An example of the collected auction curves data is provided in Figure 7.
In fact, to define wholesale supply and demand curves (equations 3 and 4), we used a non-
equidistant price grid with the following specification
pg = {−500,−450,−400, ...,−83.05,−82.85,−82.65, ..., 163.50, 213.50, 263.50, ..., 3000},
where pg stands for price grid. The use of such price grid allows us to incorporate all segments of
the supply and demand curves while retaining a particular focus on their most important parts,
i.e. on the interval from pmin,2017 to pmax,2017. Therefore, the computational burden of our model
lessens, though the quality of the results remains unchanged.
Additionally to the auction curves data, we used total load data obtained from the ENTSOE.
This data was though provided in a quarter-hourly format. Given that the auction curves data had
a hourly resolution, we used simple arithmetic averages to manipulate the load data. Moreover,
all data sets were clock-change adjusted. To replace missing hours in March, we used two values
before and after these hours. In turn, simple arithmetic averages of two double hours in October
were calculated to solve the problem.
4 Results
4.1 The obtained coefficients
The functioning of our model on real data is depicted in Figure 8 below. This Figure is based
on 365 in-sample observations with 31.12.2016 being the starting point. The obtained coefficients
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Figure 7: Wholesale market equilibrium on 2017-01-01 23:00:00. The left plot shows the entire
auction curves observed at the time point. The right plot focuses on the equilibrium between these
two curves.
for the year 2017 are summarized in Table 2 below. The conducted robustness checks show that
the coefficients are significantly different from zero. A weak significance level is exhibited only by
coefficient β1 = 0.019. Moreover, all but coefficient φ1 = 0.984 are significantly different from one.
These results allow us to conclude that the assumptions on which our model is built are valid and
reasonable.
a0 a1 γ1 φ1 α1 β1
5.890∗∗∗⋆⋆⋆
(0.076)eee
0.963∗∗∗⋆⋆⋆
(0.006)eee
0.510∗∗∗⋆⋆⋆
(0.015)eee
0.984∗∗∗
◦
(0.008)eee
0.287∗∗∗⋆⋆⋆
(0.008)eee
0.019∗⋆⋆⋆
(0.011)eee
Table 2: The obtained coefficients for the year 2017 with the following significance levels: • = 10%,
∗ = 5%, ∗∗ = 1, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 0.1% with respect to 0; ◦ = 10%, ⋆ = 5%, ⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ = 0.1% with
respect to 1.
Let us now analyze the above listed values more thoroughly. First, recall that coefficients a0 and
a1 stand for the slope and intercept, respectively, in the linear function of the internal equilibrium
price of Utility (equation 6). The obtained values indicate explicitly that the internal price of
Utility does not deviate substantially from the market price. Therefore, an earlier assumption can
be confirmed, i.e. Utility would struggle to make profits if its strategy would be much different to
that of other market players.
The second pair of coefficients is γ1 and φ1. They describe how the wholesale auction curves
are split between the three market participants. Following equations 7 and 9, the lower part of the
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wholesale supply curve (below the Utility’s internal price pU) belongs solely to Supplier. In turn,
the upper part (above the price pU) includes orders of both Utility and Supplier. As the value of γ1
suggests, orders in the upper part of the wholesale supply curve are split almost equally between
Utility and Supplier. Therefore, inelastic parts are present neither in the schedules of Supplier
(Figure 8(c)) nor in the upward-sloping curve of Utility WM (Figure 8(d)).
On the contrary, the split of the wholesale demand curve between Utility and Retailers is not
equal. As was defined in equations 8 and 10, the upper part of the wholesale demand curve (above
the price pU) contains only Retailer’s orders, whereas orders of both Utility and Retailer can be
incorporated in its lower part. The value of φ1 thus shows that Retailer retains only 0.016% of
the orders from the lower part of the wholesale demand curve. The remaining 0.984% belongs to
Utility. As a result, the lower part of the Retailer’s demand curve is almost perfectly inelastic
(Figure 8(b)).
Let us now shift our focus to coefficients α1 and β1. These coefficients, as is given in equations
14 and 15, determine the transformation of the Utility’s schedules from WM to FM setting. The
value of α1 implies that roughly 30% of the upward-sloping supply curve of Utility WM is flipped
onto the demand side. On the other hand, the value of β1 indicates that more than 98% of the
downward-sloping demand curve is transferred onto the supply side. Therefore, the lower part of
the demand curve of Utility FM is almost perfectly inelastic. Moreover, the size of the lower part
of the supply curve of Utility FM is almost maximal. Not only does Utility accumulate many
orders from the wholesale demand curve (since φ1 is very small), but also Utility flips almost the
entirety of those orders onto the supply side.
Finally, the obtained supply and demand schedules of the market participants allow us to
assemble the Fundamental Model. Note that the lower part of the demand curve of Utility FM
is almost fully inelastic. The lower part of the Retailer’s curve, too, is inelastic. Therefore, the
demand curve in our Fundamental Model consists of two parts: a relatively elastic upper part and
almost fully inelastic lower part. Thus, following our initial hypothesis, the demand curve in our
Fundamental Model lies ”in between” a perfectly inelastic one (derived in [Coulon et al., 2014])
and the initial one in the wholesale market.
Moreover, as has been mentioned earlier, the coefficient setting a0 = 0, a1 = 1, γ1 = 1, φ1 = 1,
α1 = 0 and β1 = 0 yields the model with perfectly inelastic demand. Let us scrutinize this setting
more thoroughly. The internal equilibrium price of Utility is equal to the wholesale market price
because a0 = 0 and a1 = 1. Then, Utility accumulates all possible sale and purchase orders
from the wholesale supply and demand curves since γ1 = 1 and φ1 = 1. α1 = 0 shows that the
upward-sloping curve of Utility WM remains unmodified, whereas β1 = 0 shows that the entire
downward-sloping curve is flipped onto the supply side. As a result, equilibrium volumes are equal
to those suggested by the model in [Coulon et al., 2014].
4.2 Actual electricity load and the values of vF
Besides the developed market decomposition model, the utility of our research can be well demon-
strated by Figure 9. This Figure illustrates actual load values, wholesale market equilibrium
volumes, Fundamental Model equilibrium volumes and volumes suggested by the model with per-
fectly inelastic demand for a two week sample 08-21 June 2017. To ease further notation, let us
denote the volumes suggested by the [Coulon et al., 2014] model by vC .
From Figure 9 it can be seen clearly that the values produced by our Fundamental Model are
often simply replicating the values of vC . This observation seems intuitive given the fact that we
often shift one of the Utility’s curves as described in section 2.2.4. Volumes we add to reconcile
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Figure 8: Obtaining the Fundamental Model using the German wholesale market data on 2017-
01-06 02:00:00 with a0 = 5.890, a1 = 0.963, γ1 = 0.510, φ1 = 0.984, α1 = 0.287 and β1 = 0.019
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Utility’s prices push final values vF up. However, vF ≤ vC always holds since equilibrium volumes
reach their maximum in the model with perfectly inelastic demand. Second, values vF have higher
correlation with the actual load values than those of the model by [Coulon et al., 2014]. To be
more precise, the correlation between the load and vW equals to 0.36, between the load and vC
to 0.63, and between the load and vF to 0.75. Closer correlation between vF and the load values
can be seen explicitly during e.g. night hours on 11th, 12th, 16th and 17th of June or during day
hours on 11th and 16th of June. For instance, during the early morning on 11th of June the actual
load values drop as is suggested by our Fundamental model, yet a contrary tendency is predicted
by the[Coulon et al., 2014] model.
Furthermore, note that the red curve in Figure 9 can be easily shifted upwards to match the
actual load values. In fact, shifting the red curve upwards eliminates the limitations imposed by
earlier manipulations with the Utility’s curves (section 2.2.4). As has already been mentioned,
volumes we add to reconcile Utility’s prices do not influence the shape of the demand curve in our
Fundamental Model. Therefore, these volumes only affect the position of the red curve relative to
the blue curve, but not the correlation between these two curves.
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Figure 9: Fundamental Model volumes vs. values suggested by the [Coulon et al., 2014] model vs.
actual load values vs. wholesale market volumes for a two weeks sample from 08 June 2017 to 21
June 2017
4.3 Determining the demand elasticity
Ultimately, an auxiliary study of demand elasticity was conducted. Given that our optimization
model is non-linear, our demand elasticities, too, should be non-linear. Estimating slope coefficients
by means of a linear regression does not allow non-elastic components to be traced. Therefore,
we will apply a finite central difference method to determine demand elasticities. To calculate the
slope, we will rely on a function which depends on two parameters p and h. The former parameter
is a point on the demand curve, the latter one is a shift distance form the point p and is equal to
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100 MW. Then,
ls(p, h) =
FDem
(
FDem−1(p) + h
)
− FDem
(
FDem−1(p)− h
)
2h
, (21)
where ls(p, h) approximates the slope of the demand curve in point p and is measured in EUR/MWh2.
An elasticity coefficient can thus be determined as follows
E
p
F,i =
p
FDem−1(p)
·
1
ls(p, h)
. (22)
We have then conducted the study at points p ∈ {0, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, 60} and summarized the
obtained results in Figures 10(a) and 10(b). The former one shows average values of ls(p, h), the
latter one depicts the corresponding average elasticities EpF .
Let us focus on both Figures simultaneously because the values of ls(p, h) and EpF follow
similar patterns. First, note that ls(p, h) at points p ∈ {0, 20, 25} tend to be further away from
zero. In turn, the absolute values of EpF at points p ∈ {0, 20, 25} tend to be relatively low. These
two observations are consistent with the fact that the lower part of our fundamental demand
curve is almost perfectly inelastic. Second, absolute values of ls(p, h) and EpF at points p ∈
{30, 35, 40, 45, 50} tend to be lower and higher, respectively, because these points are located in
the most elastic parts of the fundamental demand curve. Moreover, the majority of equilibrium
prices occurs within this price range.
More importantly, we see two spikes in the values of ls(p, h) and EpF at points p ∈ {30, 35, 40, 45, 50}.
These spikes occur during morning and evening hours. Similar tendencies have also been observed
by [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] and [Bigerna and Bollino, 2014]. However, contrary to these papers,
absolute values of our elasticity coefficients drop. This tendency, too, is not surprising, given the
composition of our fundamental demand curve. Points which split our fundamental demand curve
into elastic and inelastic parts are typically located within the range p ∈ {30, 50}. Therefore,
following equation 21, the difference FDem
(
FDem−1(p) + h
)
− FDem
(
FDem−1(p)− h
)
may be
large if point p is located in the very elastic part of our fundamental demand. On the other
hand, the values of EpF are small if p is located in its inelastic part. Hence, following section 2.2,
we may conclude that many demand elasticities were transferred to the supply side at the spike
points. From this perspective, our results are similar to those of [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] and
[Bigerna and Bollino, 2014].
In fact, we can compare our results with only two studies on demand elasticity in the German
wholesale electricity market. Our values (range from -0.207 to -0.01) are higher (in absolute terms)
than those of [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] (range from -0.006 to -0.001), yet follow a similar pattern.
On the other hand, our values are lower (in absolute terms) than the value −0.43 computed by
[Bo¨nte et al., 2015]. Naturally, the discrepancy between the values stems from the method we
used to determine demand elasticity. [Knaut and Paulus, 2016] and [Bo¨nte et al., 2015] used wind
speed as the key parameter in their analyses. On the contrary, our values are non-linear and are
obtained from an innovative fundamental model. Furthermore, the considered time frames, too,
are different.
To carry out a deeper sensitivity analysis, Figures 10(c) and 10(d) were constructed. The former
one summarizes average monthly elasticities for selected prices p, the latter one demonstrates day-
of-the-week elasticities. To the best of our knowledge, seasonal and day-of-the-week breakdown of
demand elasticities has never been conducted for the German wholesale electricity market.
As can be seen from Figure 10(c), there is a spike in demand elasticity in summer. Following the
reasoning in the previous paragraph, the observed tendency is consistent with [Bigerna and Bollino, 2014]
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and does not seem counterintuitive. Finally, Figure 10(d) shows that elasticities tend to be higher
during weekdays and lower over the weekend for higher values of p. The contrary can be said for
lower values of p. The observed behavior can be well explained by routine electricity consumption
patterns as described in e.g. [Weron, 2007].
5 Conclusion
Auction curves recorded in a wholesale electricity market often contain a variety of arbitrage
orders. The model developed in this paper attempts to detect and process these arbitrage orders.
As a result, we can determine a true shape of the wholesale demand curve, i.e. the curve which
is ”cleaned” from those arbitrage orders. Our demand curve thus lies ”in between” the elastic
wholesale demand curve and a perfectly inelastic demand curve, the latter being obtained by
transferring all elasticities to the supply side.
Our model allowed us to obtain a more profound understanding of the German wholesale
electricity market. In particular, we scrutinized the compositions of the wholesale demand and
supply curves. The knowledge of these compositions may be useful for further modeling of the
auction curves. Moreover, we showed that our model can approximate actual load values observed
in an electricity market better than the model with perfectly inelastic demand curve. Therefore, the
solution we elaborated can be well suitable for load forecasting. Furthermore, our paper provides
presumably the second (after [Knaut and Paulus, 2016]) in-depth analysis of demand elasticity in
the German wholesale electricity market.
There exist numerous possibilities for further research. First, our model can be extended from
the case of a market with single Utility, Retailer, and Supplier. One can easily incorporate e.g.
multiple Utilities, several types of Retailers, or differently acting Suppliers into the model. Second,
one can smoothen the transition from elastic to inelastic parts in our fundamental demand curve.
Currently there is a single point which splits this curve into two parts. Third, transaction costs can
be considered. Their presence may substantially alter the behavior of market participants. Finally,
the model can be extended with multiple coefficients, especially for determining the optimal amount
of must-run supply and demand. As was mentioned in section 2.2.4, volumes of sell orders at price
pmin and of buy orders at price pmax are much larger than those of other orders. Therefore, must-
run orders can be treated differently. In fact, knowing the size of must-run buy and sell orders
would allow us to omit the manipulations described in the second step of section 2.2.4. Shifting
one of the Utility’s curves to reconcile equilibrium prices will no longer be necessary because the
optimal sizes of must-run supply and demand would be determined by the model.
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Figure 10: The analysis of demand elasticities
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